There is an ongoing debate among philosophers and ethicists as to whether or not a man is capable of performing a morally neutral act. Like all of moral philosophy this seemingly theoretical question has practical and, more importantly, eternal consequences for the rest of us. In performing an impromptu poll among Catholics I know, most of them said “of course there are morally neutral acts” and then proceeded to list off a few, none of which were morally neutral. In this post then I would like to address this question in hopes of not just solving a problem, but changing the way the reader approaches everything that he does.
In approaching this question there is an important distinction that must be made. St. Thomas in his treatise on human actions (ST II-I q.6) reminds the reader that there are two “types” of actions in which a human being is the agent. First there are what he calls “acts of man.” These are natural acts of man that involve his vegetative and sense faculties such as digestion, growth, heartbeats, sensual perceptions (like seeing and hearing) and so forth. These acts are performed without any movement of the intellect and will and are in no way voluntary. Once they do become voluntary (such as when we choose to look at something) they fall into the second category; what St. Thomas calls human acts. These actions, because they involve deliberation and choice, are voluntary actions. Morality concerns itself only with human acts.
Just because acts of man are not voluntary does not mean that they are morally neutral. Just as we would not say actions of an animal are morally neutral because they do not proceed from a voluntary action, so too we would not say that these acts of man are morally neutral. They are not morally anything because they are not morally evaluable.
Human Acts
Once this distinction is made and we focus only on moral acts, we can begin to see why no action is morally neutral. In evaluating the moral status of any given human act, St. Thomas suggests that one should look at four particular components; its genus, its species, the circumstances surrounding the act and its end (ST I-II, q.18).
It is the first two components, genus and species, that define the object of the human act. The object of the act would be how one would define it if they were to witness the act. These moral objects can be good, evil or indifferent based upon their relationship to reason. It is the object that determines whether a given act can be ordered to the good or not (Vertiatis Splendor, 79).
Yes, I said that the moral object can be indifferent or neutral, but that does not mean that the action itself is morally neutral. Because no human act takes place in a vacuum, it is also necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding the act. In saying that the circumstances “surround” the act one is able to catch a glimpse into their relationship with the exterior action. Circumstances are related to the exterior action as accidents. This means that because they are truly exterior to the moral act they are not good or evil in themselves. However some circumstances are morally relevant and thus add a character of good or evil to the action. The morally relevant circumstances would be those that affect the relation of the act to man’s ultimate end according to reason.
We can imagine actions that are both indifferent in their object and in their circumstances. Yet still this does not prove there are morally neutral actions because one needs to evaluate the act from the point of the view of the moral agent in considering the end that is intended. While the external act and the circumstances may be morally neutral, no voluntary action can be considered neutral from the point of view of intention. Every voluntary act is done for a purpose. The purpose is either in accord with right reason and thus is a good act, or it is contrary to right reason and thus considered an evil act (ST II-I, q.18, a.9).
It becomes evident then that one can say there are two ends to each exterior act: the end of the act itself and the end which the agent intends. How these two ends are related can be understood by relying on St. Thomas’ use of matter and form. He says “(H)uman activity is defined formally by its goal and materially by its external object” (ibid). This is an important point that follows from this.
The intention of the agent is more important than the end of the act itself in evaluating the act morally. However, because the exterior action is the means to carry out the end the agent intends, it must be a good means for accomplishing that end. That is there are some objects like murder for example that can never be ordered to a good end. Secondly, although one can separate the two ends in theory, they both form a single act. In other words for the act to potentially be good, both must be good. Likewise, while a good intention may lessen the moral gravity of an objectively evil act, it cannot make the act itself good. However, a bad motive can change the moral quality of an otherwise good action.
The exterior act itself is objective but to only emphasize this component is to fall into legalism. The intent is subjective, but to only emphasize this principle is to fall into subjectivism. Finally, the circumstances are relative, but to only emphasize this is to fall into moral relativism.
Clearing Up Any Confusion
A few examples may help to make all that has been said clear. Suppose a man sees an older woman carrying a large heavy bag and looks like she is preparing to cross the street. He decides to carry the bag for her (the object). She really is going to cross the street (circumstances). He wants to perform a kind act (intention). This is a morally good act because all three components are good. Now take the same object and intention, but now the woman tell him she does not want to cross the street. This becomes a morally bad act because it is contrary to reason to carry a bag for someone across the street who is not going to cross the street. Finally suppose that the object and the circumstances are the same as the original example but now the intention is to impress the woman’s daughter. Now the act becomes morally bad because it is done with a bad intention.
That exercise is clear but what about something like eating lunch, or more specifically eating a sandwich for lunch? The object is good—providing nourishment to your body, but the other two components are what determine whether it is a morally good act or not. Have you already eaten enough? Is it the last sandwich? Are there other people that need to eat? All of these circumstances have bearing on the moral evaluation of it. What about the intention? Are you eating because you are nervous or because you are hungry? Are you eating because you want to keep someone else from eating or are you leaving half the sandwich because someone else needs to eat as well? Each of the circumstances and intentions will determine whether it is a morally good or bad act, but none of them will make it morally neutral. To eat when you are hungry is in accord with right reason and therefore a good action. Eating a sandwich for lunch can be a morally good act!
Herein, I think, lay the confusion. We think of morality in terms of breaking rules and not primarily as acting in accord with right reason. There is no moral law against eating a sandwich for lunch therefore it is permissible. Permissibility implies neutrality. But once we slide into the realm of thinking in terms of permissibility and not in terms of right reason we only try to avoid doing anything wrong and lose our desire to do good all the time. And this is why this question is completely practical. Once we see right and wrong in this light and not necessarily as not breaking a rule, we begin to thrive as persons. When we recognize that the good is always an option for us, we develop all the virtues at a faster pace. When we begin to taste the sweetness of the fruit of virtue, we desire to have our reason rightly formed so that conscience may judge the good to be done at all times. There are no morally neutral acts, indeed.